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In models with heterogeneous ﬁrms trade integration has a positive impact on aggregate
productivity through the selection of the best ﬁr m sa si m p o r tc o m p e t i t i o nd r i v e st h el e a s t
productive ones out of the market. To quantify the impact of ﬁrm selection on productivity,
we calibrate and simulate a multi-country multi-sector model with monopolistic competition
and variable markups using ﬁrm-level data and aggregate trade ﬁgures on a panel of 11 EU
countries. We ﬁnd that EU trade has a sizeable impact on aggregate productivity. In 2000
the introduction of prohibitive trade barriers would have caused an average productivity loss
of roughly 13 per cent, whereas a reduction of intra-EU trade costs by 5 per cent would have
generated a productivity gain of roughly 2 per cent. Productivity losses and gains, however,
vary a lot across countries and sectors depending on market accessibility and trade costs. We
provide evidence that our results are robust to alternative distance and productivity measures.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent models with heterogeneous ﬁrms international trade integration has a positive impact
on aggregate productivity through the selection of the best ﬁrms (Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz,
2003). The reason is a combination of import competition and export market access. On the one
hand, as lower trade costs allow foreign producers to target the domestic markets, the operating
proﬁts of domestic ﬁrms in those markets shrink whatever their productivities. On the other
hand, some domestic ﬁrms gain access to foreign markets and get additional proﬁts from their
foreign ventures. These are the ﬁrms that are productive enough to cope with the additional costs
of foreign activity (such as those due to transportation and remaining administrative duties or
institutional and cultural barriers). The result is the partition of the initially active domestic ﬁrms
in three groups. As they start making losses in their home markets without gaining access to
foreign markets, the least productive ﬁrms are forced to exit. On the contrary, as they are able to
compensate lost proﬁts on home sales with new proﬁts on foreign sales, the most productive ﬁrms
survive and expand their market shares. Finally, ﬁrms with intermediate levels of productivity
also survive but, not being productive enough to access foreign markets, are relegated to home
sales only and their market shares fall. Since international trade integration eliminates the least
productive ﬁrms, average productivity grows through the reallocation of productive resources from
less to more eﬃcient producers.
This mechanism ﬁnds empirical support in ﬁrm-level analyses that have tried to identify the
direction of causation hidden in the positive correlation between the export status of a ﬁrm and
its productivity (called ‘exceptional exporter performance’ by Bernard and Jensen, 1999). This
is a crucial issue for trade policy. Causation going from export status to ﬁrm performance would
reveal the existence of ‘learning by exporting’ and therefore call for export promotion. However,
apart from peculiar cases, most of the evidence supports reverse causation in the form of ‘selection
into export status’: ﬁrms that already perform better have a stronger propensity to export than
other ﬁrms (Tybout, 2002). Selection comes with two additional eﬀects that are consistent with
the theoretical argument discussed above. First, exposure to trade forces the least productive
ﬁrms to shut down (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Aw, Chung and
Roberts, 2000). Second, trade liberalization leads to market share reallocations towards the most
productive ﬁrms (Pavcnik, 2002; Bernard, Jensen and Schott 2003). On both counts, aggregate
average productivity improves.
The empirical relevance of the selection eﬀect motivates additional eﬀorts towards quantifying
its contribution in terms of gains from trade. This line of research is heralded by Tybout (2002) and
pursued by Bernard et al. (2003) through the simulation of counterfactual scenarios. These authors
s t a r tw i t hn o t i n gt h a tt h ed i ﬀerences in measured productivity (e.g. value added per worker) across
ﬁrms can be generated only by theoretical models assuming imperfect competition. Two options are
then available. Diﬀerences can be derived from constant markups (i.e. Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic
competition) together with ﬁxed costs of entry and of exporting. This is the option chosen by
Melitz (2003). Alternatively, diﬀerences can be obtained from variable markups even without any
ﬁxed cost. This is the option chosen by Bernard et al. (2003), who propose a model obtained by
introducing Bertrand competition in the probabilistic Ricardian framework developed by Eaton and
Kortum (2002). They then calibrate the parameters of their model on U.S. data. In particular, they
use aggregate production and trade data among the 47 leading U.S. export destinations (including
the U.S. itself) to calibrate the parameters governing geographic barriers, aggregate technology
diﬀerences, and diﬀerences in input costs. U.S. plant level data are used, instead, to calibrate the
parameters that relate to the heterogeneity of goods in production and consumption. Finally, the
calibrated model is used to assess the impacts of various counterfactual scenarios. In the focal
2one, Bernard et al. (2003) report a 4.7 percent increase in the average productivity of U.S. ﬁrms
resulting from a 5 percent reduction in world trade barriers.1
The counterfactual analysis by Bernard et al. (2003) reveals the empirical tractability of their
model. Their treatment of market structure implies, however, some analytical shortcoming. First
of all, a certain good in a certain country is always supplied by one ﬁrm only. This is the lowest-cost
supplier of that good to that country. Indeed, under Bertrand competition, all other ﬁrms are kept
out through limit pricing: the lowest-cost producer quotes a price that matches the second-lowest
cost of supplying that good to that country. Accordingly, to derive the price and markup quoted
f o re a c hg o o di ne a c hc o u n t r y ,o n en e e d st ok n o ww h i c hﬁrms are the lowest and the second-lowest
cost suppliers from each potential source country. This problem becomes tractable if one is ready
to assume that in each country the lowest and the second-lowest costs are realizations of random
variables drawn from probability distributions. In this respect, Bernard et al. (2003) show that the
Fréchet family yields tractable distributions for prices and markups along with simple expressions
for bilateral trade shares. As a result, however, the equilibrium distribution of markups is invariant
to country characteristics and to geographic barriers, which are crucial features of the real world.
Moreover, in Bernard et al. (2003), ﬁrms’ entry does not respond to market proﬁtability. This
removes an important channel through which industry equilibrium is eventually restored and gives
the model a strong short-run ﬂavor. Diﬀerently, building on Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition,
the model of Melitz (2003) allows many producers with diﬀerent costs to simultaneously serve the
same market, which is consistent even with arm-chair evidence. This model, however, is analytically
tractable only if countries are identical and all bilateral trade barriers are the same. This clearly
undermines empirical calibration and makes the model a fairly unpromising tool to deal with
counterfactual analysis. Moreover, its implication of constant and equal markups across all ﬁrms,
no matter where they produce and sell, ﬂies in the face of empirical evidence showing that markups
do vary across ﬁrms and markets (Tybout, 2002).2
The aim of the present paper is to supplement the existing literature in two respects. First, we
perform a counterfactual analysis in the case of monopolistic competition to match what has been
achieved by Bernard et al. (2003) with Bertrand competition. Second, in so doing we propose a
multi-sector empirical implementation of the model by Melitz and Ottaviano (2005), who obtain
variable markups in a highly tractable asymmetric multi-country framework with monopolistic
competition, thus overcoming some of the theoretical limitations of both the Bertrand and Dixit-
Stiglitz models.
Our dataset covers aggregate and ﬁrm-level evidence on a panel of 11 EU countries. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst analysis that uses comparable individual panel data across
countries to investigate how trade integration aﬀects aggregate productivity in the presence of ﬁrm
selection. In particular, we use the calibrated model to explore two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario,
we assess the productivity losses that would be associated with autarky (‘costs of non-Europe’).3
1Recent evidence on the existence of causation from trade to aggregate income and productivity is provided by
Frankel and Rose (2002), who ﬁnd per capita income to be positively aﬀected by the formation of currency unions,
thanks to their positive impact on trade, and by Alcalà and Ciccone (2004), who report strong support for a positive
causal eﬀect of trade on labor productivity. With respect to our analysis, Alcalà and Ciccone (2004) provide the
interesting insight that, at the aggregate level, such a positive causation mainly acts through total factor productivity.
2Other related contributions include Asplund and Nocke (2005) as well as Bernard, Redding and Schott (2006).
The former investigate the eﬀect of market size on entry and exit rates in a monopolistically competitive industry
with linear demand and hence variable markups. They focus, however, on a closed economy. The latter present a
model of comparative advantage and heterogenous ﬁrms where country size matters for the aggregate productivity
responses to trade liberalization. They use, however, CES preferences and focus on a two-country set-up. The
analytical tractability of the multi-country case is the comparative advantage of the model by Melitz and Ottaviano
(2005) we extend and calibrate.
3The expression ‘cost of non-Europe’ was introduced to refer to the economic cost of failing to complete the common
3We ﬁnd that, if in 2000 trade had been inhibited altogether, average productivity would have
dropped by roughly 13 percent. This would have mapped into a 16 percentage increases in average
markups and average prices. As less productive ﬁrms would have been able to enter and survive,
average proﬁts would have fallen by 23 per cent.4A similar thought experiment is performed by
Eaton and Kortum (2002) in their probabilistic Ricardian framework applied to a sample of 19
OECD countries in 1990. Using aggregate data, they calculate that the average productivity loss
associated with autarky for our 11 countries is equal to roughly 4 per cent. The diﬀerence may be
explained by the fact that they do not have imperfect competition, their base year pre-dates ours
by a decade, and OECD countries are generally less integrated than EU ones. The second scenario
is designed to assess the productivity gains from further integration (‘gains from (freer) trade’).
For the sake of comparison we follow Bernard et al. (2003) and study the impact of a 5 per cent
reduction in trade barriers. We ﬁnd that in 2000 such reduction would have caused an average
productivity increase of roughly 2 per cent with 2 percentage falls in average prices and markups
as well as a 5 percentage increase in average proﬁts. The increase in productivityis smaller than
the increase of roughly 5 per cent obtained by Bernard et al. (2003) for the US. Although the two
outcomes may appear to diﬀer considerably, it is worth noting that US productivity is higher than
the average European productivity. Indeed, when focusing on the most productive countries in our
European sample, namely Germany and Denmark, we get very similar eﬀects (respectively, 4.6 and
4.4 per cent). More generally, in both scenarios we ﬁnd that productivity gains vary a lot across
countries and sectors depending on market accessibility and trade costs.5
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections. Section 2 presents the theoretical model.
Section 3 derives its equilibrium properties, then designs the calibration and simulation strategy.
Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 calibrates the model. Section 6 simulates alternative
integration scenarios while Section 7 provides evidence that our results are robust to alternative
distance and productivity measures. Section 8 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
In the wake of Melitz and Ottaviano (2005),consider an economy with M countries, indexed by
l =1 ,...,M.C o u n t r yl hosts Ll consumers, each supplying one unit of labor.
2.1 Preferences and demand
Preferences are deﬁned over S horizontally diﬀerentiated goods, indexed by s =1 ,...,S,a n da
homogenous good chosen as numeraire. Each diﬀerentiated good s is composed by a continuum
of varieties indexed by i ∈ Ωs. All consumers share the same preferences in all countries and the
market. This is the subject of a landmark study by the European Commission, the Cecchini report, presented in
March 1988.
4As we will discuss, there is no obvious way to calibrate the preference parameters. Hence, we are not able to
assess the quantitative impact of counterfactual scenarios on the number of ﬁrms and, therefore, on overall welfare.
Nevertheless, in the theoretical model indirect utility turns out to be positively correlated with average productivity
irrespective of the number of ﬁrms.
5Smith and Venables (1988) simulate the eﬀects of a reduction of intra-EU trade costs in a model with imperfect
competition and homogeneous ﬁrms. Their estimated reductions in average prices are distinctively smaller than ours
(see Section 6.2). This reveals the importance of allowing for ﬁrms heterogeneity and selection eﬀects. Also related
to our work is the vast literature on Computable General Equilibrium (CGE). Diﬀerently from the CGE approach,
our analysis is not conceived as an evaluation of the overall eﬀects of a given policy, but rather as an exercise of
comparative statics carried out under the ceteris paribus assumption. In particular, it is better understood as an
attempt to isolate the implications of endogenous productivity, which is usually taken as given by the CGE literature
(Haaland and Norman,1992).




































s(i) represent the individual consumption levels of the numeraire good and variety
i of good s. The demand parameters αs, ηs,a n dγs are all positive. For each diﬀerentiated
good s, the parameters αs and ηs index the substitution pattern between its varieties and the
numeraire: increases in αs and decreases in ηs both shift out the demand for the diﬀerentiated
varieties relative to the numeraire. The parameter γs indexes the degree of product diﬀerentiation
between the varieties of good s. In the limit when γs =0 , consumers only care about their total




s(i)di. Such varieties are then perfect
substitutes. The degree of product diﬀerentiation increases with γs as consumers give increasing
weight to the distribution of consumption levels across varieties.
The marginal utilities for all goods are bounded, and a consumer may thus not have positive
demand for any particular good. We assume that consumers have positive demands for the nu-
meraire good (dl







s(i) > 0.L e te Ωl
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s be the subset of varieties of good s consumed in country
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where Nl
s is the measure of consumed varieties in e Ωl
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price. The set e Ωl














Any price above αs must violate this condition since the marginal utility in (2) is bounded above
by αs; hence ¯ pl
s ≤ αs (the inequality must be strict when there is any price heterogeneity). For a
given level of product diﬀerentiation γs, lower average prices ¯ pl
s or a larger number of competing
varieties Nl
s induce an increase in the price elasticity of demand and decrease the price bound (or
choke price) deﬁn e di n( 4 ) .O nb o t hc o u n t s ,l o w e r¯ pl
s or a larger Nl
s generate a ‘tougher’ competitive
environment.
2.2 Production and ﬁrm behavior
There is only one factor of production, labor, which is internationally immobile and inelastically
supplied in segmented national market under perfect competition. The production of the numeraire
good faces constant returns to scale and unit cost. Also this good is traded in a competitive
market, which is however perfectly integrated among countries.These assumptions imply a unit
wage in all countries as long as the numeraire good is produced in all countries, which is henceforth
assumed. Entry in each diﬀerentiated product sector is modeled as a research and development
(R&D) process with uncertain outcome. Speciﬁcally, each entrant has to invent its own variety
and a corresponding production process by making an irreversible investment of fE,s units of
5numeraire. In so doing a prospective entrant knows it is going to ﬁnd a new variety for sure and
that production will occur under constant returns to scale. It does know, however, the marginal
cost of production c as this will be randomly determined only after the investment in R&D has been
s u n k .I ne a c hc o u n t r yl and sector s uncertainty is modeled as a draw from a common and known
distribution Gl
s(c),w i t hs u p p o r t[0,c l
M,s], which varies across sectors and countries. This allows us
to introduce (probabilistic) ‘comparative advantage’ stemming from technological diﬀerences that













countries l and h are said to have comparative advantages in sectors s and r respectively: relative
to entrants in h (l), entrants in l (h) have a ‘better chance’ of getting lower cost draws in sector s
than in sector r.6
Since the entry cost fE,s is sunk, only ﬁrms that can cover their marginal cost survive and
produce. All other entrants exit without even starting production. Surviving ﬁrms maximize
their proﬁts facing the demand function (3). Given the continuum of competitors, a ﬁrm takes
t h ea v e r a g ep r i c el e v e l¯ pl
s and numbers of ﬁrm Nl
s as given. This is the essence of monopolistic
competition. Moreover, national markets are segmented, although ﬁrms can produce in one market
and sell in the other, incurring a per-unit trade cost. The overall cost of a delivered unit with cost
c from country h to country l is τhl
s c with τlh
s > 1, where (τhl
s −1)c is the frictional trade cost. We
interpret such cost in a wide sense as stemming from all distance-related barriers. For this reason,
even within countries, trade may not be costless and we allow for τll
s ≥ 1.
Let plh
s (c) and qlh
s (c) represent the levels of the proﬁt maximizing price and quantity sold for
a ﬁrm in sector s producing in country l with cost c and selling to country h. Since national
markets are segmented and ﬁrms produce under constant returns to scale, they independently









denote the maximized value of these proﬁt sa saf u n c t i o no ft h eﬁrm’s marginal cost c.T h e nt h e






s (c) − τlh
s c
¤
.O n l y
ﬁrms earning non-negative proﬁts in a market will choose to sell in that market. This leads to
similar cost cutoﬀ rules for ﬁrms selling in the various markets. Let clh
s denote the upper bound
cost for ﬁrms producing in country l and selling to country h.T h i sc u t o ﬀ must then satisfy:
clh
s =s u p
n
c : πlh












s , e.g. higher trade barriers from h to l make it harder for exporters
from h to break even relative to their competitors from k.T h e c u t o ﬀs summarize all the eﬀects
of market conditions relevant for ﬁrm performance. In particular, the optimal prices and output































Finally, entry is unrestricted in all countries. Firms choose a production location prior to entry
and sink the corresponding entry cost. Free entry of ﬁrms in country l implies zero expected proﬁts
in equilibrium, hence:











which, together with (5), determines the cost cutoﬀs clh
s .T h e s e c u t o ﬀ, in turn, determine the










































is the average cost of surviving ﬁrms.
3 Equilibrium
We are now ready to determine the equilibrium distribution of ﬁr m sa c r o s sc o u n t r i e sa n dt h e
associated trade ﬂows.
3.1 Parametrization of technology
All the results derived in the previous section hold for any distribution of cost draws Gl
s(c). However,
to implement the model empirically, we use a speciﬁc parametrization for the distribution whose
empirical relevance will then be tested. In particular, we assume that in sector s and country
l productivity draws 1/c follow a Pareto distribution with lower productivity bound 1/cl
M,s and








,c ∈ [0,c l
M,s]. (10)
The shape parameter ks indexes the dispersion of cost draws in sector s and it is the same in all
countries. When ks =1 , the cost distribution is uniform on [0,c l
M,s].A sks increases, the relative
number of high cost ﬁrms increases, and the cost distribution is more concentrated at these higher
cost levels. As ks goes to inﬁnity, the distribution becomes degenerate at cl
M,s.A n y t r u n c a t i o n
of the cost distribution from above at clh
s <c l
M,s retains the same distribution function and shape
parameter ks. The productivity distribution of ﬁrms producing in l and selling to h is therefore also





¢ks ,c∈ [0,c lh
s ].






¢−ks ∈ (0,1] measure the ‘freeness’ of trade for exports from l to h,w h i c ha l l o w su s













































is an index of absolute advantage in sector s. T h i sy i e l d sas y s t e mo fM
















h =1 ,...,M, (11)
where |Ps| is the determinant of the trade freeness matrix and
¯ ¯Clh
s
¯ ¯ i st h ec o f a c t o ro fi t sρlh
s
element. Cross-country diﬀerences in cutoﬀs arise from three sources: own country size (Lh),







beneﬁting from a larger local market, a better distribution of productivity draws, and better market
accessibility have lower cutoﬀs.
Under the Pareto assumption, the delivered cost of domestic ﬁrms τhh
s c ∈ [0,c hh
s ] and the
delivered cost of exporters τlh
s c ∈ [0,c hh






¢ks. The price distribution in country h of domestic ﬁrms producing in
h, phh
s (c), and exporters producing in l, plh
s (c), are therefore also identical, which implies that the
average price in country h and sector s equals:
¯ ph









s /(2ks +2 )and ch
s = kschh
s /(ks +1 )respectively are the average markup and the
average cost of ﬁrms selling to country h in sector s. Hence, a percentage change in the cutoﬀ chh
s
has the same percentage impact on both the average markup µh
s (‘pro-competitive eﬀect’) and the
average cost ch
s (‘selection eﬀect’). Together these eﬀects imply the same percentage impact on







s, a one percentage change in the cutoﬀ chh
s causes a percentage
change of −ks in the average proﬁt. Unfortunately, as there is no obvious way to calibrate the
preference parameters, we will not be able to assess the quantitative impact of counterfactual
scenarios on the number of sellers (‘variety eﬀect’) and thus on overall welfare. Nevertheless, the
theoretical model implies that the indirect utility is negatively correlated with the average cost no
matter what happens to product variety (see Appendix).
3.3 Trade ﬂows
Our model yields a gravity equation for aggregate bilateral trade ﬂows. In sector s an exporter from
l to h with cost c generates export sales rlh
s (c)=plh
s (c)qlh




























8Aggregating these export sales rlh
s (c) over all exporters from l to h (with cost c ≤ clh
s ) yields the














































This is a gravity equation in so far as it determines bilateral exports as a (log-linear) function
of bilateral trade barriers and country characteristics. In particular, it reﬂects the combined eﬀects
of country size, technology (comparative advantage), and geography (accessibility) on both the
extensive (number of traded goods) and intensive (amount traded per good) margins of trade
ﬂows.8 It highlights how a lower cutoﬀ cll
s dampens exports by making it harder for potential
exporters to break into that market. Also note the role of the internal freeness of trade ρhh
s ,w h i c h
has a negative impact on international trade ﬂows.
3.4 From theory to simulation
How large are the productivity gains from EU integration due to the impact of freer trade on
competition and selection? Our model can be used to address this question by building on equations
(11) and (13). In so doing, we proceed in two stages. We start with calibrating the model. Then
we use the calibrated model to investigate the eﬀects of diﬀerent integration scenarios.
In the calibration stage, we ﬁrst use trade and geographical data for the year 2000 to recover the





¢−ks from the gravity equation (13). This allows us to get the
freeness matrix Ps and to compute its determinant and co-factors that appear in equation (11). We
then use a database on manufacturing ﬁrms belonging to 11 EU countries to estimate individual
total factor productivities (TFP) for the year 2000. >From such productivities we recover two
additional elements of equation (11): the shape parameter of the underlying Pareto distribution
(ks)a n dt h eM endogenous domestic cut-oﬀs( chh
s ) by sector. Using the computed values of Ps, ks
and chh
s together with data on population Lh,w eﬁnally solve (11) to obtain the index of absolute
advantage ψl
s up to a sector speciﬁc constant (related to fE,s and γs).
In the simulation stage, we run a counterfactual analysis on the calibrated model. In particular,
we simulate the changes in productivity due to diﬀerent trade costs by recomputing chh
s for alterna-
tive freeness matrices Ps. Two scenarios are considered. One in which international trade costs are
prohibitive (ρlh
s =0for l 6= h) and one in which international trade costs (τlh
s for l 6= h) are reduced
by 5 per cent. The ﬁrst scenario provides us with an assessment of the ‘costs of non-Europe’. The
second scenario gives us a measure of the ‘gains from (freer) trade’, that is, the gains from further
integration.
4D a t a
In our empirical analysis we take advantage of diﬀerent datasets. For the productivity estimations
we extensively use the Amadeus database provided by Bureau Van Dijk. This dataset gives (har-




s ) represents the proportion of entrants N
l
E,s in l that export to h.
8See Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004) for similar results derived from
diﬀerent models.
9monized) yearly balance-sheet information on the biggest 250,000 European ﬁrms for the period
1994-2003. To the best of our knowledge, it is the only dataset that provides comparable individual
ﬁgures for a relatively large group of countries. In particular, Amadeus provides information on
value added, ﬁxed assets (capital), sales, and the cost of materials (intermediates consumption)
in thousands of euros, as well as on the number of employees. We focus on manufacturing ﬁrms
in western Europe for the year 2000. We choose that year because of the quality of the data and
the fact that no major economic change took place. We consider only those countries for which a
reasonable data coverage exists. We eliminate missing values and extreme observations, deﬁned as
having either a capital/employees or value added/employees ratio which is out of the range iden-
tiﬁed by the 1st and the 99th percentile. This leaves us with a sample of 22,120 ﬁr m sa c r o s s1 1
countries as listed in Table 1.9
Table 1: Data coverage across countries for the year 2000 (Amadeus only).
Country initials Country Frequency Percent
BE Belgium 1557 7.04
DE Germany 385 1.74
DK Denmark 309 1.40
ES Spain 2730 12.34
FI Finland 529 2.39
FR France 3956 17.88
GB Great Britain 4514 20.41
IT Italy 5735 25.93
NL Netherlands 861 3.89
PT Portugal 156 0.71
SE Sweden 1388 6.27
Total 22120 100
As one can see in the table, data coverage for Germany, which is the biggest EU economy, is
rather poor. This is the reason why we complement our Amadeus data with information coming
from the MIP database on German ﬁrms provided by the Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschafts-
forschung (ZEW). The MIP database has relatively smaller ﬁrms than Amadeus. However, the
productivity of German ﬁrms in the two samples is not much diﬀerent and both samples reveal
that Germany is the most productive country. The MIP contains information on value added,
employment and input consumption. The capital variable is reconstructed by using the book value
of capital in 1998, adding investments at the end of the period and applying the relevant deﬂa-
tors. After eliminating missing as well as extreme observations, the MIP database provides us with
roughly 700 additional ﬁrms. Although our results are virtually the same when we use the Amadeus
data only, the actual sample we rely on for productivity estimations contains those additional ﬁrms.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables in the combined Amadeus-MIP database are given in
Table 2.
As a benchmark we estimate ﬁrm-level productivity by simple OLS in the year 2000. However,
one may wonder to what extent our results are robust to considering more accurate estimators of
productivity. To address this concern, in Section 7.1 we also implement the approach by Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003), which uses intermediates consumption to control for unobservables.10 As panel
9Sample statistics suggest that observations are missing at random within each country so that our sample seems
to be representative.
10The alternative approach by Olley and Pakes (1996), which uses investment to control for unobservables, can not
10Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the OLS estimation dataset (Amadeus and MIP).
N. ﬁrms Mean St. dev. Min Max
Sales 22801 146008.9 1739573 2 162000000
Value added 22801 47083.5 511309 18 44500000
Capital 22801 72865.69 937859.3 8 89100000
Intermed. consumpt. 22801 57920.58 428622.7 1 26900000
Employees 22801 667.84 6027.05 1 449594
Note: All variables except Employees are in thousands of euros.
information is needed in this case, we build another dataset using years 1998, 1999 and 2000.
When eliminating missing (as well as extreme) observations for intermediates consumption, the
combined Amadeus-MIP sample is reduced to approximately 14,500 ﬁrms per year (for a total of
42,663 observations in the three years). This reduction is mainly due to the fact that there is no
information available on ﬁrms’ input consumption for Great Britain and Denmark. This explains
why, as detailed in Table 3, the panel for the Levinsohn-Petrin procedure covers 9 countries only.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables used from this panel dataset are given in Table 4.
Table 3: Data coverage across countries for the Levinsohn and Petrin estimation (Amadeus and
MIP): years 1998-1999-2000.
Country initials Country Frequency Percent
BE Belgium 4107 9.63
DE Germany 2202 5.16
ES Spain 6603 15.48
FI Finland 1290 3.02
FR France 9951 23.32
IT Italy 15399 36.09
NL Netherlands 987 2.31
PT Portugal 294 0.69
SE Sweden 1830 4.29
Total 42663 100.00
Turning to the industry disaggregation, we work with a 18 sectors breakdown of manufacturing
activities, which derives from merging the information contained in the Amadeus and MIP databases
—o r g a n i z e db y2 - d i g i t sN a c er e v . 1a n dt h u sl e a d i n gt o2 3m a n u f a c t u r i n gs e c t o r s—w i t ht h a t
contained in the database we use to compute trade costs (see below) — organized by 3-digits ISIC
rev 2 and thus leading to 26 manufacturing industries. The resulting industry disaggregation is
d e t a i l e di nT a b l e5 .
The data we use to compute trade costs are provided by the Centre d’Etude Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationales (CEPII). The main dataset, used in Mayer and Zignago (2005),
involves trade and production ﬁgures in a compatible ISIC 3-digit classiﬁcation for a large set of
countries over the 1976-2001 period.11 These data allow us to recover both the internal (EXPll
s )
be applied to the Amadeus database because this does not contain any information on ﬁrms’ investments.
11For details, see http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/TradeProd.htm.
11Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the Levinsohn and Petrin estimation dataset (Amadeus and MIP).
N. ﬁrms Mean St. dev. Min Max
Sales 42663 92577.97 699496.4 1 65700000
Value added 42663 26198.83 232179.1 12 19700000
Capital 42663 35942.36 385963.2 4 35700000
Intermed. consumpt. 42663 47006.06 308579.9 1 26900000
Employees 42663 385.53 2142.79 1 142881
Note: All variables except Employees are in thousands of euros.
Table 5: Sectoral disaggregation.
Industry code Industry description
1 Food beverages and tobacco
2 Textiles
3 Wearing apparel except footwear
4 Leather products and footwear
5 Wood products except furniture
6 Paper products
7 Printing and Publishing
8 Petroleum and coal
9 Chemicals
10 Rubber and plastic
11 Other non-metallic mineral products
12 Metallic products
13 Fabricated metal products
14 Machinery except electrical
15 Electric machinery
16 Professional and scientiﬁc equipment
17 Transport equipment
18 Other manufacturing
and the external (EXPlh
s with l 6= h) ﬂows of goods. To estimate the freeness of trade ρlh
s from the
gravity equation (13), we complement trade and production data with geographical variables, in
particular bilateral distances and common language indicators, which are also provided by CEPII.
For both geographical variables several alternative measures are available.12. To recover the bilateral
trade costs for our 11 countries in 2000, we consider trade among 15 European countries (our 11
countries plus Austria, Greece, Ireland and Norway) in the years from 1999 to 2001. We use
a larger number of countries and three years to obtain more accurate measures. Table 6 shows
descriptive statistics of the trade and geographical variables. The data are organized by ﬂows and
the number of observations (12,150) is given by the number of origins (M =1 5 ), times the number
of destinations (M =1 5 ), times the number of sectors (S =1 8 ), times the number of years (which
are 3).
The variable EXPlh
s in the table corresponds to trade ﬂows (both internal and external) in
thousands of US dollars. The common language variable is a dummy indicating whether a couple
12For details, see http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm.
12Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the trade and geographical variables used.
N. observ. Mean St. dev. Min Max
EXPlh
s 12150 746444.9 4308752 0 113000000
Common language 12150 0.06 0.24 01
dist 12150 1320.49 767.00 68.44 3362.98
distcap 12150 1333.98 760.74 68.44 3362.98
distw 12150 1344.83 732.85 66.78 3383.27
distwces 12150 1288.80 757.22 13.18 3364.83
Population 11 32159.82 28060.35 5176.209 82211.51
Note: EXP
lh
s is in thousands of US dollars while all distance variables are in
km. The common language variable is a dummy while population is in
thousands of inhabitants.
of countries share a common oﬃcial language.13 The distance variables are in km and cover sim-
ple measures (dist and distcap)a n dw e i g h t e dm e a s u r e s( distw and distwces). Simple (geodesic)
distances are calculated following the great circle formula, which uses the latitudes and longitudes
of the most important cities/agglomerations (in terms of population) for the dist variable and the
geographic coordinates of the capital cities for the distcap variable. Both variables incorporate in-
ternal distances that, as in the theoretical model, are allowed to be non-zero. As in Head and Mayer
(2002, 2004), the internal distance dll of country l is calculated from its area as dll =( 2 /3)
p
areal/π.
This formula models the average distance between a producer and a consumer on a stylized geog-
raphy where all producers are centrally located and the consumers uniformly distributed across a
disk-shaped region.
By contrast, weighted distances use city-level data on distances and the geographic distribution
of population (in 2004) inside each nation. The basic idea is to calculate the distance between
two countries as the weighted average bilateral distance between their biggest cities with the corre-
sponding weights determined by the shares of those cities in the overall national populations. This
procedure can be used in a totally consistent way for both internal and external distances. Specif-
ically, the general formula developed by Head and Mayer (2002) calculates the distance between













where popp (popr) designates the population of agglomeration p (r) belonging to country l (h).
The parameter θ measures the sensitivity of trade ﬂows to bilateral distance dpr. For the distw
variable, θ is set equal to 1.T h edistwces calculation sets it equal to −1, which corresponds to the
standard distance coeﬃcient estimated from gravity equations. Our benchmark distance variable
is distw. We will show, however, in Section 7.3 that our results are robust to alternative measures
of distance.
For some robustness checks, we will use value added per hour worked in US dollars for our 11
countries by NACE rev.1 industries in the year 2000 as well as the corresponding total amount of
13In the CEPII database, there are two alternative common language indicators based on diﬀerent deﬁnitions. One
indicator considers that two countries share a common language as long as at least 20 per cent of the two populations
speak that language. The other one is similar, but the threshold is now between 9 per cent and 20 per cent. We
experimented both indicators getting similar results.
13hours worked for each country-sector cell. These data are available from the Groningen Growth and
Development Centre (GGDC).14 Finally, data on population come from the New Cronos database
provided by EUROSTAT. They refer to the year 2000 in thousands of inhabitants.
5C a l i b r a t i o n
To gauge the impact of trade openness on domestic productivity, we need to recover the parameters
of the model and in particular those of equation (11).
5.1 Trade costs
The starting point of our estimation strategy is the gravity equation (13), which will allow us






(13), one can easily see that the only term that depends on both l and h is ρlh
s .I n f a c t , t h e
other terms either depend on the origin country only (Nl
E,sψl







¢−(ks+2)/ks), or they are constant (1/[2γs (ks +2 ) ] ). Therefore, as in Head and
Mayer (2004) and Redding and Venables (2004), one can isolate the eﬀects of these latter terms by
means of dummies for origin (EXl) and destination (IMh) countries.15 As to the freeness of trade,
we follow Head and Mayer (2004), assuming that ρlh
s =e x p ( βh + λL a n g lh)( dlh)δs if l 6= h,a n d
ρlh
s =( dlh)δs if l = h,w h e r edlh is distance between l and h, βh is a coeﬃcient capturing the fall in
trade due to crossing country h border, and Langlh is a dummy variable that takes value one if l
and h share a common language. In other words, as standard in the gravity literature, trade costs
are a power function of distance while crossing a border or not sharing the same language impose
additional costs. Taking the log of equation (13) we thus get the following regression:
ln(EXPlh
s )=EXl + IMh + δs ln(dlh)+βh Borderlh + λL a n g lhBorderlh +  lh (15)
where Borderlh is a dummy variable that takes value one if l 6= h (‘border eﬀect’). In estimating
15, we use data from years 1999, 2000, and 2001 to run a single regression in which we also put year
and industry dummies. The coeﬃcient on distances is industry speciﬁc while the border eﬀect is
country speciﬁc. We do not consider country-industry speciﬁcb o r d e re ﬀects because they impose
too many parameters and their estimation would be inaccurate. It is important to stress that the
speciﬁcation used to estimate ρlh
s gives country-industry-sector speciﬁc transportation costs and
that in general ρlh
s 6= ρhl
s due to border eﬀects. Moreover, ρll is always less than one due to internal
distances.
A visual impression of how openness to international trade varies across countries is given by
Figure 1, which shows the average (across sectors and origins) of the estimated ρlh
s excluding ρll
s,






s /((M − 1)S), for l 6= h.T h e ﬁgure reveals that centrality matters with the
Netherlands and Belgium being the most open countries. Germany, Denmark and Great Britain
are also relatively open, while peripheral Italy, Spain, Norway and Greece are rather closed. The
sectoral variation of trade costs (which is essentially due to the δs) is shown in Table 7, which
reports the estimated distance coeﬃcients. The values are in line with previous ﬁndings for Europe
14Respectively, ICOP Database 1997 Benchmark (http://www.ggdc.net) and 60-Industry Database October 2004
(http://www.ggdc.net).
15This ‘ﬁxed eﬀect’ approach does not suﬀer from the speciﬁcation problems of standard gravity equations discussed
by Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). In particular, these authors show that ﬁxed eﬀects regressions generate
parameter estimates that are very similar to those obtained using their multilateral resistance terms.
14by Head and Mayer (2004). In particular, ‘Printing and publishing’ as well as ‘Petroleum and
coal’ are the least tradable goods while ‘Textiles as well as leather products and footwear’ are
characterized by the smallest trade costs.
Table 7: Sectoral trade elasticities with respect to distance.
Industry code Industry description δs
1 Food beverages and tobacco -1.7434
2 Textiles -1.0527
3 Wearing apparel except footwear -1.3452
4 Leather products and footwear -1.1064
5 Wood products except furniture -2.0185
6 Paper products -1.4278
7 Printing and Publishing -2.4556
8 Petroleum and coal -2.4164
9 Chemicals -1.3820
10 Rubber and plastic -1.6271
11 Other non-metallic mineral products -1.7603
12 Metallic products -1.4470
13 Fabricated metal products -1.7210
14 Machinery except electrical -1.4861
15 Electric machinery -1.1236
16 Professional and scientiﬁc equipment -1.5079
17 Transport equipment -1.4588
18 Other manufacturing -1.7206
Average -1.6000
5.2 Total factor productivity
After calculating ρlh
s , we still have to recover the shape parameter of the underlying Pareto distri-
bution of productivity (ks), and the M endogenous domestic cut-oﬀ chh
s for each sector. For this
we need to estimate the distributions of ﬁrm-level productivities for all sectors and countries. As a
benchmark, we will rely on simple OLS estimations based on the regression
ln(VA i)=const + aln(CAPi)+bln(EMPLi)+εi (16)
where VA i is value added, CAPi is capital (ﬁxed assets), EMPLi i st h en u m b e ro fe m p l o y e e so f
ﬁrm i and the sector/country indices have been dropped to alleviate the notation. The estimated
productivity of ﬁrm i is thus ˆ Prodi,OLS =e x p ( ˆ const +ˆ εi). As robustness check, in Section 7.1
we will show that a more sophisticated estimation methodology of ﬁrm productivity, based on
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), yields very similar results.
OLS estimations of productivity are carried out separately for each of the 18 manufacturing
industries considered. However, we do not make separate estimations by country assuming de facto
that countries have the same technology up to a scale factor (Hicks neutral factor augmenting
technology). The evidence provided by Treﬂer (1995) supports this assumption for all countries in
the sample except Portugal.16 Note that our assumption does not imply that all countries use the
16In unreported estimations, where we exclude Portugal, we ﬁnd qualitatively similar results to the ones we report
when Portugal is included in the sample.
15same capital/labor ratio. If Germany is more capital abundant than Italy, then capital would be
relatively cheaper in Germany with ﬁrms having a higher capital/labor ratio. The fact that we do
not carry out separate estimations by country has strong empirical advantages. First, it allows us
to have a better measure of productivity as for some countries there are very few country-sector
observations. Second, it avoids the following problem. If we found the sum of the coeﬃcients a
and b to diﬀer between two countries, then our estimated average productivity would turn out to
be higher in the country with the lower sum simply because this would map into a higher value of
the constant.17
Table 8 shows average (across ﬁrms) OLS productivity by country, as well as per capita income
in PPS.18 As one can see, the two measures are closely related, with the correlation being 0.61.T h e
table shows that our OLS estimates of productivity are generally in line with aggregate ﬁgures. A
notable exception is Germany, whose omission increases the correlation between productivity and
GDP to 0.88. The reason is that both the Amadeus and the MIP databases have a strong bias
towards West German ﬁrms, which are known to be much more productive than East German ones.
However, our results on the aggregate gains from trade are not much sensitive to the exclusion of
Germany, so we decided to keep it in the analysis. Figure 2 reports all estimated productivities by
sector and country.
Table 8: Productivity across countries: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country OLS Productivity Per capita GDP in PPS
BE Belgium 43.22 104.30
DE Germany 63.63 101.60
DK Denmark 50.26 114.56
ES Spain 32.61 83.78
FI Finland 37.17 102.59
FR France 40.22 103.13
GB Great Britain 38.95 102.14
IT Italy 40.30 99.35
NL Netherlands 42.25 108.53
PT Portugal 24.24 73.08
SE Sweden 34.44 106.91
Average 40.06 100.00
Now that we have ˆ Prodi,OLS for all ﬁrms in the year 2000, we can use them to estimate the shape
parameter ks of the Pareto distribution and the cutoﬀs chh
s .19 To estimate the former, it is useful
to recall the following property. Consider a random variable X (our productivity) with observed
cumulative distribution F(X). If the variable is distributed as a Pareto with shape parameter ks,
then the OLS estimate of the slope parameter in the regression of ln(1 − F(X)) on ln(X) plus a
constant is a consistent estimator of −ks and the corresponding R2 is close to one.20 Table 9 shows
the estimated ks and the R2 of our regressions by sector. For all sectors the R2 is far above 0.8,w h i c h
17The estimated values of a + b are all between 0.9 and 1.0 and never signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1.T h e ya r et h u s
in line with constant returns to scale.
18Per capita income in PPS should be a better measure of ‘physical’ productivity because it deﬂates nominal values
by country speciﬁc price indices.
19One can reasonably argue that considering only one year may be problematic whenever the business cycles do not
coincide across countries. To address such concern, we have also estimated 7-year average individual productivities.
The corresponding results are very similar to the 1-year estimates, so we do not report them.
20See Norman, Kotz and Balakrishnan (1994).
16shows that the Pareto is a fairly good approximation of the underlying productivity distributions,
and the average ks is estimated to be close to 2. Large values of ks characterize sectors in which the
productivity distribution is skewed towards relatively small and ineﬃcient ﬁrms (‘Leather products
and footwear’, ‘Wood products except furniture’, ‘Rubber and plastic’, ‘Fabricated metal products’,
‘Machinery except electrical’). Small values of ks are associated, instead, with an even distribution
of ﬁrms across all productivity levels and sizes (‘Wearing apparel except footwear’, ‘Petroleum and
coal’, ‘Chemicals’, ‘Professional and scientiﬁc equipment’).21
Table 9: Sectoral ks and the R2 from the regression method.
Industry code Industry description ks R2
1 Food beverages and tobacco 2.004 0.898
2 Textiles 2.248 0.872
3 Wearing apparel except footwear 1.804 0.904
4 Leather products and footwear 2.345 0.893
5 Wood products except furniture 2.454 0.871
6 Paper products 1.966 0.827
7 Printing and Publishing 1.988 0.898
8 Petroleum and coal 1.604 0.862
9 Chemicals 1.811 0.848
10 Rubber and plastic 2.372 0.868
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 2.156 0.826
12 Metallic products 2.206 0.848
13 Fabricated metal products 2.450 0.875
14 Machinery except electrical 2.346 0.898
15 Electric machinery 1.930 0.881
16 Professional and scientiﬁc equipment 1.844 0.856
17 Transport equipment 2.062 0.861
18 Other manufacturing 2.128 0.900
Average 2.095 0.871
Turning to the cut-oﬀs chh
s , these are country and sector speciﬁc. In the model, they represent
the highest cost (or equivalently the reverse of the lowest productivity) of active domestic ﬁrms.
The maximum likelihood estimator of the cut-oﬀ for a Pareto distribution is the minimum observed
value. However, this is probably a rather unreliable method to implement with micro data because
of extreme observations. Consequently, we prefer to use a moment estimator based on the formula
of the mean of a Pareto. Speciﬁcally, if X (our productivity) is distributed as a Pareto with
shape parameter ks and cut-oﬀ x then its mean is E(X)=xk s/(ks −1). Using the country-sector
average productivities and the previously estimated shape parameters, such formula can be inverted
to recover all the productivity cut-oﬀs, which are simply scaled average productivities. Finally, in
order to pass from productivity cutoﬀs to cost cutoﬀs, which are those needed in equation (11), we
simply need to raise the productivity cut-oﬀst ot h ep o w e ro fm i n u so n e . 22
21We have also tried alternative estimation techniques for ks, such as the inverse of the standard error of ln(X).
Overall results are very similar.
22Two sectors (number 4 and 8) in Denmark have missing c
hh
s because we do not have observations (ﬁrms) for
them. This explains why, in the Tables where we show the results of our simulations, average gains across sectors
and countries do not perfectly match.
176 Simulation
We start with taking a logarithmic transformation of equation (11):
ln(chh
















where as =( fE,s γs)ks+2,a n dbs =2 ( ks +1 ) ( ks +2 ) /Lh.S of a r ,w eh a v ec o m p u t e dρlh
s (so we are
able to evaluate both
¯ ¯Clh
s
¯ ¯ and |Ps|), ks and chh
s .W ea l s oh a v eLh, which is simply the population
of county h. Therefore, we know everything about (17) except as, which is industry speciﬁc, and
ψl
s, which is country and industry speciﬁc. However, as is a log-linear term that simply cancels out
when comparing (as we do) productivity scenarios obtained with diﬀerent trade costs. For each
sector s we can thus set as =1without loss of generality and then solve the resulting non-linear
system of 11 equations (17) in the 11 unknown ψl
s’s (one per country). With the ψl
s’s we can ﬁnally
simulate the model and evaluate the changes in average productivity induced by changes in the
freeness of trade. This amounts to computing the new equilibrium chh
s ’s and comparing them with
the initial ones.23 In particular, we consider the two following scenarios:
1. A situation in which international trade barriers are prohibitive (i.e. ρlh
s =0for l 6= h).
This provides an assessment of the overall ‘costs of non-Europe’ as measured by foregone
productivity were EU countries to become autarkic.
2. A situation in which international trade costs (τlh
s for l 6= h) are reduced by 5 per cent. This
provides an assessment of the ‘gains from (freer) trade’.
6.1 Costs of non-Europe
Table 10 shows the average ‘costs of non-Europe’ by country. These are measured as minus per-
centage changes in mean productivity (i.e. percentage changes in the cutoﬀ chh
s )w i t hr e s p e c tt o
the estimate in the year 2000.
Based on our simulations, autarky reduces average productivity by 12.58%.T h i si sas i z e a b l e
number and suggests that the selection eﬀect is an important channel through which the beneﬁts
of international trade materialize. This number, however, varies considerably across countries.
Germany, with 23.29%, is the country that loses the most, closely followed by Denmark (22.29%).
At the other extreme, there is Great Britain with a mere 3.31% followed by Portugal (4.62%)a n d
Italy (6.66%). According to our economic model, such losses are positively correlated (0.26)w i t h
the openness to trade (see ¯ ρh in the last column), so central countries lose more when turning
to autarky. Such correlation is not perfect because of comparative advantage and diﬀerent trade
costs across sectors. For example, the big losses of Germany and Denmark are essentially due to
their high underlying productivities (low chh
s with no trade) whose beneﬁcial eﬀect is magniﬁed by
international trade.
23If one were interested in ranking countries according to their average absolute advantage ψ
l
s,t h i sc o u l db e
obtained by solving the system of equations (17) and removing the sectoral scaling term as = fE,s γs from the
solutions. Speciﬁcally, sectoral scaling could be removed by taking the logarithm of the solutions and regress the
results on a complete set of industry dummies. The country average of the regression residuals across sectors could
then be used as a measure of the average absolute advantage. When we follow such procedure, we ﬁnd that Finland,
Sweden and Denmark are the top three countries in terms of average absolute advantage. Interestingly enough,
these three countries are ranked ﬁrst, third and fourth respectively (the US come second) in terms of the Global
Competitiveness Index calculated by the World Economic Forum (2005).
18Table 10: Costs of non-Europe by country: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country chh
s with trade chh
s with no trade % Cost of non-Europe ¯ ρh
BE Belgium 0.049 0.059 16.72 0.00028
DE Germany 0.037 0.048 23.29 0.00005
DK Denmark 0.043 0.055 22.29 0.00009
ES Spain 0.058 0.066 11.63 0.00001
FI Finland 0.058 0.067 13.34 0.00002
FR France 0.053 0.061 13.05 0.00002
GB Great Britain 0.060 0.061 3.31 0.00005
IT Italy 0.058 0.061 6.66 0.00001
NL Netherlands 0.051 0.057 12.03 0.00026
PT Portugal 0.090 0.093 4.62 0.00002
SE Sweden 0.068 0.076 11.43 0.00004
Average 0.057 0.064 12.58 0.00008
It is interesting to compare our results with those obtained by Eaton and Kortum (2002) for
the same thought experiment in a probabilistic Ricardian framework. Those authors calculate
the fall in productivity (measured as GDP per worker) due to autarky for a sample of 19 OECD
countries in 1990. For our 11 European countries the average decrease in productivity is 3.95%,
m u c hs m a l l e rt h a no u r12.58%. The discrepancy may be due to the diﬀerent sample of interacting
countries. In particular, OECD countries are generally less integrated than EU ones. Moreover,
Eaton and Kortum (2002) simulate a perfectly competitive model and their base year pre-dates
ours by a crucial decade for European integration.
Table 11: Costs of non-Europe by industry: OLS estimations.
Industry code Industry description chh
s with trade chh
s with no trade δs % Cost of non-Europe
1 Food beverages and tobacco 0.096 0.104 -1.743 8.95
2 Textiles 0.033 0.040 -1.053 18.45
3 Wearing apparel except footwear 0.042 0.049 -1.345 16.66
4 Leather products and footwear 0.043 0.054 -1.106 24.17
5 Wood products except furniture 0.043 0.046 -2.019 6.51
6 Paper products 0.076 0.092 -1.428 17.37
7 Printing and Publishing 0.039 0.041 -2.456 5.92
8 Petroleum and coal 0.145 0.157 -2.416 9.51
9 Chemicals 0.059 0.069 -1.382 13.96
10 Rubber and plastic 0.050 0.056 -1.627 10.00
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.071 0.079 -1.760 10.55
12 Metallic products 0.059 0.066 -1.447 10.16
13 Fabricated metal products 0.039 0.042 -1.721 8.75
14 Machinery except electrical 0.036 0.040 -1.486 11.23
15 Electric machinery 0.055 0.063 -1.124 14.49
16 Professional and scientiﬁce q u i p m e n t 0.042 0.049 -1.508 14.71
17 Transport equipment 0.064 0.072 -1.459 12.33
18 Other manufacturing 0.038 0.042 -1.721 11.69
Average 0.057 0.064 -1.600 12.52
Turning to sectoral disaggregation, Table 11 shows the average costs of non-Europe by industry
and compares them with the elasticity of trade ﬂows to distance (δs), as obtained from the gravity
equation. In the table losses are positively correlated with the elasticity (0.78): the smaller the
absolute value of the elasticity (i.e. the more a sector is open), the larger the corresponding loss
from autarky.
196.2 Gains from (freer) trade
The eﬀects of a 5 per cent reduction in international trade barriers are reported in Table 12, which
shows the percentage changes in average productivity (‘gains from (freer) trade’) by country and
compares them with the ‘costs of non-Europe’. The table shows that the ‘gains from (freer) trade’
are highly correlated with the ‘costs of non-Europe’ (0.90), Portugal being the main exception. As
before, both accessibility and comparative advantage positively aﬀect the productivity increase due
to a more competitive environment. The overall gains from trade are 2.13%. This is a sizeable
number, although smaller than the 4.7% productivity increase obtained by Bernard et al. (2003)
for the US when considering the same percentage fall in trade costs. Besides diﬀerences in the
underlying models, the fact that the US are a very productive country may help explain such
discrepancy. Indeed, the two most productive countries in our sample, Denmark and Germany,
experience comparable gains, respectively 4.4% and 4.6%. Furthermore, the fact that we analyze
trade among a smaller set of countries and that we do not consider intermediate goods, whose price
reduction is the main driver of the gains in Bernard et al. (2003), may also explain why we get
smaller impacts.
Table 12: Gains from (freer) trade by country: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country % Gains from trade % Costs of non-Europe
BE Belgium 2.86 16.72
DE Germany 4.60 23.29
DK Denmark 4.40 22.29
ES Spain 2.11 11.63
FI Finland 1.81 13.34
FR France 1.74 13.05
GB Great Britain 0.23 3.31
IT Italy 0.66 6.66
NL Netherlands 1.24 12.03
PT Portugal 2.02 4.62
SE Sweden 1.81 11.43
Average 2.13 12.58
It is also interesting to compare our ﬁndings with those in Smith and Venables (1988), who
simulate the eﬀects of a reduction of intra-EU trade costs in a CGE model with increasing returns to
scale, segmented markets and product diﬀerentiation. Firms are identical within countries but they
are allowed to diﬀer in size and product lines between countries. Market structure is alternatively
modeled as Cournot or Bertrand competition with free or restricted entry. Thus, while our model
stresses the impact of trade on market share reallocations (‘selection eﬀect’), their model focuses
instead on scale economy exploitation (‘scale eﬀect’). In Smith and Venables (1988) a decline
in trade costs makes competition ﬁercer, decreases prices, and expands sales. Due to increasing
returns to scale, average costs fall, especially with free entry. However, as ﬁrms are identical
within countries, no market share reallocations take place towards more productive ﬁrms. Though
simulations are run for many industries, only for ‘Domestic electrical equipment’ reported data
allow for a reasonable comparison with our analysis. In the closest speciﬁcation to our model,
Smith and Venables (1988) estimate that a 8% reduction in trade costs yields a 0.76% drop in
average production costs. This is smaller than the 1.94% decrease in average costs we ﬁnd for
‘Electric Machinery’ as response to a 5% reduction in trade costs (see Table 13). We interpret this
20diﬀerence as capturing the relative importance of the scale and selection eﬀects. Indeed, as argued
by Tybout and Westbrook (1996), the neglect of ﬁrm heterogeneity implies that scale eﬀects may
be even overstated in CGE models such as Smith and Venables (1988). On the one hand, exporting
plants are typically the largest in their industry, so they are not likely to exhibit much potential for
further scale economy exploitation. On the other hand, large plants also account for most of the
production in any industry, so foregone economies of scale due to downscaling in import-competing
sectors are also likely to be minor.
Table 13: Gains from (freer) trade by industry: OLS estimations.
Industry code Industry description % Gains from trade % Cost s of non-Europe
1 Food beverages and tobacco 1.12 8.95
2 Textiles 3.16 18.45
3 Wearing apparel except footwear 2.52 16.66
4 Leather products and footwear 6.40 24.17
5 Wood products except furniture 0.97 6.51
6 Paper products 4.65 17.37
7 Printing and Publishing 0.71 5.92
8 Petroleum and coal 1.62 9.51
9 Chemicals 1.70 13.96
10 Rubber and plastic 1.65 10.00
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 1.72 10.55
12 Metallic products 1.23 10.16
13 Fabricated metal products 1.30 8.75
14 Machinery except electrical 1.75 11.23
15 Electric machinery 1.94 14.49
16 Professional and scientiﬁce q u i p m e n t 2.41 14.71
17 Transport equipment 1.59 12.33
18 Other manufacturing 1.89 11.69
Average 2.13 12.52
As to the sectoral dimension, Table 13 reports the simulated ‘gains from (freer) trade’ by
industry as percentage changes in average productivity with respect to the year 2000. These are
compared with the corresponding ‘costs of non-Europe’. As expected, the correlation between the
two eﬀects is high (0.91). In particular, the ﬁnding that industries with small distance elasticity
gain more from trade liberalization is conﬁrmed.24
7 Robustness checks
In this section we explore how sensitive our results are to alternative measures of productivity and
distance as well as to alternative ways of recovering the shape parameter ks.
7.1 Individual productivity
In section 5.2 we estimated individual productivity as the exponential of the residual of a simple
OLS regression of (the log of) value added on (the log of) capital and labor. All the results
obtained so far are based on that estimate. We now repeat the analysis relying on a diﬀerent
estimation procedure. The aim is to assess the robustness of our ﬁndings when one takes into
account the possible presence of a simultaneity bias in the OLS estimate. The main idea is that a
ﬁrm hires capital and labor after having observed the realization of its random TFP. The larger the
realization, the larger the quantities of inputs hired. As long as the realization is unobservable to the
econometrician, the regressors in (16) are thus correlated with the residual of the OLS regression.
24In unreported simulations we have also considered alternative changes in trade costs, obtaining results that nearly
perfectly correlate with the ones we report. For instance, a 5% increase in international trade costs yields a 1.57%
reduction in average productivity, with correlations with the ‘costs of non-Europe’ and the ‘gains from (freer) trade’
as high as 0.97 and 0.98 respectively.
21Table 14: Productivity across countries: LP estimations.
Country initials Country LP Productivity OLS Productivity
BE Belgium 128.58 43.22
DE Germany 233.03 63.63
ES Spain 115.14 32.61
FI Finland 118.52 37.17
FR France 121.96 40.22
IT Italy 117.92 40.30
NL Netherlands 168.42 42.25
PT Portugal 113.93 24.24
SE Sweden 80.75 34.44
Average 133.14 39.79
The bias can be removed by identifying an observable proxy variable and introducing it as
an additional regressor in (16). The proxy is such that, according to economic theory, it can be
expected to respond to the TFP realization observed only by the ﬁrm. Accordingly, the residual of
the new regression is free from any correlation with the inputs due to the asymmetric observability
of realized TFP. This approach, originally proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996) using investment
as a proxy, has been recently extended by Levinshon and Petrin (2003) (henceforth LP) using
intermediate inputs instead. Data availability forces us to choose the latter proxy since for our
sample of Amadeus ﬁrms there is no information available on investment. Moreover, as information
on the cost of materials is not available for Denmark and Great Britain, also the LP procedure can
be implemented on a sample of 9 countries only. That is why we preferred to rely on OLS in our
benchmark analysis.25
Table 15: Costs of non-Europe by country: LP estimations.
Country initials Country % Costs of non-Europe LP % Costs of non-Europe OLS
BE Belgium 11.30 16.72
DE Germany 22.73 23.29
ES Spain 9.51 11.63
FI Finland 15.19 13.34
FR France 10.78 13.05
IT Italy 5.52 6.66
NL Netherlands 12.19 12.03
PT Portugal 5.35 4.76
SE Sweden 6.09 11.43
Average 10.96 12.54
The LP estimates for the year 2000 are reported in Table 14, which shows the average produc-
t i v i t yb yc o u n t r y . 26 Although absolute levels are quite diﬀerent, the correlation between the OLS
25There is indeed another point that led us to prefer OLS: the returns to scale estimated by LP are in some cases
signiﬁcantly smaller than one. This is probably due to the bad measurement of input consumption, whose deﬁnitions
may not be homogeneous across countries.
26The relevant capital, intermediates, and value-added deﬂators are used.
22Table 16: Costs of non-Europe by industry: LP estimations.
Industry code Industry description % Cost s of non-Europe LP % Cost s of non-Europe OLS
1 Food beverages and tobacco 7.36 7.98
2 Textiles 14.84 18.27
3 Wearing apparel except footwear 16.90 18.12
4 Leather products and footwear 29.41 29.27
5 Wood products except furniture 5.84 6.87
6 Paper products 16.51 18.32
7 Printing and Publishing 4.98 6.23
8 Petroleum and coal 10.51 11.63
9 Chemicals 12.21 13.40
10 Rubber and plastic 6.45 10.10
11 Other non-metallic mineral products 8.51 9.31
12 Metallic products 9.05 10.33
13 Fabricated metal products 6.77 9.06
14 Machinery except electrical 12.95 10.75
15 Electric machinery 10.60 13.28
16 Professional and scientiﬁce q u i p m e n t 10.74 12.70
17 Transport equipment 9.45 12.16
18 Other manufacturing 8.43 13.31
Average 11.20 12.84
Table 17: Gains from (freer) trade: LP estimations.
Country initials Country % Gains from trade LP % Gains from trade OLS
BE Belgium 1.28 2.86
DE Germany 5.19 4.60
ES Spain 1.56 2.11
FI Finland 2.61 1.81
FR France 1.20 1.74
IT Italy 0.50 0.66
NL Netherlands 1.24 1.24
PT Portugal 0.12 2.46
SE Sweden 0.89 1.81
Average 1.62 2.14
and LP estimates within a sector is around 0.90, so the two estimates diﬀer only for a scaling factor,
which is innocuous for our counterfactual analysis. Still, a problem seems to appear for Germany
and Sweden, which are respectively too much and too little productive in the LP estimates with
respect to the OLS ones.
Tables 15, 16 and 17 show the results of our counterfactuals when LP rather than OLS pro-
ductivities are used to calibrate the model. The two former tables report the ‘costs of non-Europe’
for countries and sectors respectively. The latter displays the ‘gains from (freer) trade’. To ease
comparison, we also report the OLS results for the same countries and sectors.27 The tables show
that results are largely consistent between the LP and OLS simulations. On average, both the
‘costs of non-Europe’ and the ‘gains from (freer) trade’ are smaller when LP productivities are
used, but this is not unexpected because there are missing countries in the LP sample and thus the
potential beneﬁts from trade are smaller.
27Four sectors (number 4, 8, 16 and 18) for Portugal have missing c
hh
s because we do not have observations (ﬁrms)
for them. This is the reason why, when comparing LP with OLS gains, OLS values for Portugal are slightly diﬀerent
from those reported in the previous section. Furthermore, considering that two countries are lost when computing
LP productivities, OLS sectoral gains are also diﬀerent from those previously reported.
237.2 Aggregate productivity
As shown in Table 1, data coverage in the Amadeus dataset is not very satisfactory for some coun-
tries, namely Denmark, Germany, and Portugal. In the case of Germany we have complemented our
data with additional ﬁrm level information provided by ZEW (see Section 4). Nevertheless, even
though we eventually succeed in having a good sample of German ﬁrms, an issue of representative-
ness due to small sample size still remains for the other countries. More generally, one could also
argue that, since the Amadeus coverage is generally biased towards large ﬁrms, representativeness
is potentially an issue for all our countries.
To address these concerns, we repeat our simulation exercise relying on the country-sector pro-
ductivities provided by GGDC (see Section 4). Under the Pareto assumption, such aggregates
allow us to recover alternative measures of the domestic cutoﬀs chh
s by adequately scaling up the
corresponding average productivities. The GGCD dataset contains the (producer) price adjusted
value added per hour worked for each of the 18x11 country-sector pairs in US dollars for the year
2000.28 It represents the most accurate and comparable existing record of international produc-
tivities. Compared with our individual estimates, it has the advantage of being based on a very
large ﬁrm coverage. Moreover, its productivities are deﬂated by industry-speciﬁcp u r c h a s i n gp o w e r
parities, which accounts for the fact that prices vary across countries and thus gives a more reliable
measure of ‘physical’ productivities. GGDC productivities, however, do not take into account capi-
tal intensity as we instead do when estimating individual TFP. Moreover, for one sector (‘Petroleum
and coal’) no productivity data is available and we have to restrict our analysis on 17 industries.
Table 18: Costs of non-Europe by country: AP estimations.
Country initials Country % Costs of non-Europe AP % Costs of non-Europe OLS
BE Belgium 26.79 17.14
DE Germany 8.67 24.06
DK Denmark 28.94 22.29
ES Spain 10.43 10.31
FI Finland 22.88 12.80
FR France 25.17 13.20
GB Great Britain 5.81 3.40
IT Italy 12.39 6.98
NL Netherlands 19.72 12.52
PT Portugal 3.30 4.89
SE Sweden 23.89 12.02
Average 17.09 12.69
Tables 18 and 19 show the simulations based on GGDC data together with (comparable) simu-
lations based on individual data.29 In the former table, the average ‘costs of non-Europe’ increase
from 12.69 to 17.09 per cent. The correlation between the results based on the two datasets is
0.90 (0.53) if Germany is excluded (included). Hence, an issue of representativeness may exist for
Germany only. Indeed, in the GGDC database, where the coverage is as good for the former East
28Speciﬁcally, we have combined the ICOP Industrial Database (New Benchmarks), which reports the productivi-
ties, with the 60-Industry Database (October 2004), which reports the total number of hours worked. Data originally
f o l l o wt h eN a c er e v . 1c l a s s i ﬁcation. We have converted them into our 18-industry classiﬁcation by weighting the
disaggregated productivities by the total number of hours worked in each Nace industry.
29When simulating the model calibrated on GGDC data, we use the ks’s from the OLS-based individual productivity
distributions.
24Table 19: Gains from (freer) trade: AP estimations.
Country initials Country % Gains from trade AP % Gains from trade OLS
BE Belgium 11.00 2.98
DE Germany 0.86 4.81
DK Denmark 5.54 4.40
ES Spain 1.48 1.69
FI Finland 7.53 1.71
FR France 14.29 1.79
GB Great Britain 0.59 0.23
IT Italy 2.10 0.69
NL Netherlands 3.82 1.30
PT Portugal 0.55 2.14
SE Sweden 9.15 1.91
Average 5.17 2.15
Germany as for West Germany, German ﬁrms are much less productive than in the individual sam-
ple. Once this is controlled for, the overall ‘costs of non-Europe’ and much more their distribution
across countries seem to be fairly robust. If anything, our benchmark results may underestimate
the overall selection eﬀects. Similar conclusions can be reached for the ‘gains from (freer) trade’ by
inspecting Table 19.
7.3 Trade costs
S of a rw eh a v er e l i e do nas p e c i ﬁcb i l a t e r a ld i s t a n c em e t r i c( distw). We now check to what extent
our results depend on such metric. First of all, we simulate the model again for each of the
alternative metrics (distswces, dist and distcap) discussed in Section 4. While all of them account
for internal distances their own way, there is still no general consensus on how to deal with them and
even on whether they should be included at all. For this reason, we also present the results under
the assumption of irrelevant internal distances (ρll
s =1 ).30 Finally, as shown by Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006), the presence of heteroschedasticity and truncation in log-linearized models (such
as a gravity equation) may induce a systematic bias in OLS estimation. Thus, we also estimate
trade costs following the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood (PPML) method they propose using
our preferred distance measure distw as well as internal distances.
Tables 20 and 21 show that, no matter how internal distances are measured, results are essen-
tially unchanged (Columns 3 to 6). When internal distances are, instead, neglected (Column 7),
both the ‘costs of non-Europe’ (18.20%) and the ‘gains of (freer) trade’ (5.12%) are considerably
larger than in the baseline case. This is not surprising because omitting internal distances amounts
30With no internal distances, the freeness of trade ρ
lh
s is still computed on the basis of equation (15) with interna-
tional distances based on distw. However, only observations for which l 6= h are considered and borders eﬀects are
no more identiﬁable. Moreover, to make ρ
lh
s economically comparable to the assumed ρ
ll
s =1 ,w eh a v et or e - s c a l e
the unit of measurement of distance so that, once trade costs are computed with internal distances, the average ρ
ll
s is
still equal to one for each sector. In this respect, it is important to point out that the value of ρ
lh
s has no ‘absolute’
interpretation because of the arbitrariness in the choice of the distance unit. More precisely, the unit of measurement




s )i si m m a t e r i a lf o rt h es i m u l a t i o n sa sl o n ga si n t e r n a ld i s t a n c e s
are considered because it simply has a multiplicative eﬀect on all elements of the matrix Ps. What matters, instead, is




s , which determines the ‘relative’ degree of international openness and so the contribution
of foreign competition to selection.
25Table 20: Costs of non-Europe by country with diﬀerent distance measures and estimation tech-
niques.
Country initials Country % non-Europe % non-Europe % non-Europe % non-Europe % non-Europe % non-Europe
BE Belgium 16.72 24.23 24.66 23.71 39.94 23.91
DE Germany 23.29 21.81 26.83 18.63 21.48 26.27
DK Denmark 22.29 29.30 22.31 23.14 39.62 30.50
ES Spain 11.63 8.83 8.10 9.46 7.91 13.80
FI Finland 13.34 12.32 21.58 21.94 19.23 21.77
FR France 13.05 12.73 12.87 14.79 9.70 15.36
GB Great Britain 3.31 2.99 4.64 5.21 5.09 5.48
IT Italy 6.66 7.35 4.03 4.39 5.76 9.86
NL Netherlands 12.03 16.58 15.39 15.84 30.52 18.12
PT Portugal 4.62 2.04 4.47 4.45 8.04 7.83
SE Sweden 11.43 10.52 12.06 13.01 12.92 16.70
Average 12.58 13.52 14.27 14.05 18.20 17.24
Distance measure distw distwces dist distcap no internal dist. distw
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML
Table 21: Gains from (freer) trade by country with diﬀerent distance measures and estimation
techniques
Country initials Country %t r a d eg a i n s %t r a d eg a i n s %t r a d eg a i n s %t r a d eg a i n s %t r a d eg a i n s % trade gains
BE Belgium 2.86 6.87 5.65 8.95 33.63 4.08
DE Germany 4.60 4.09 4.85 2.64 1.82 5.54
DK Denmark 4.40 11.27 4.34 4.54 13.88 7.44
ES Spain 2.11 1.53 1.14 1.51 1.24 2.56
FI Finland 1.81 1.83 4.52 4.55 3.65 5.17
FR France 1.74 1.90 1.28 1.46 0.82 1.92
GB Great Britain 0.23 0.21 0.31 0.33 0.21 0.31
IT Italy 0.66 0.82 0.37 0.41 0.51 0.96
NL Netherlands 1.24 2.06 1.67 1.37 -1.70 3.61
PT Portugal 2.02 0.32 1.67 1.50 0.70 0.73
SE Sweden 1.81 1.73 2.46 2.82 1.54 1.54
Average 2.13 2.97 2.57 2.73 5.12 3.08
Distance measure distw distwces dist distcap no internal dist. distw
Estimation method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML
to setting border eﬀects to zero, thus increasing the observed international openness. Consequently,
going back to autarky becomes more costly and a given reduction in trade costs corresponds to a
more open environment. Moreover, setting ρll
s =1underestimates (overestimates) the degree of
internal freeness of trade in small (large) countries, thus increasing (decreasing) the relative im-
portance of international trade for competition and selection. This is why for small countries like
Belgium and the Netherlands the cost of non-Europe is bigger when all ρll
s are set to 1. Similar
arguments apply to PPML-based simulations. A constant outcome of such a methodology is to
provide smaller estimates of the distance elasticity (δs) with respect to OLS. Therefore, the world
appears to be much more open to trade and autarky is more costly. As in the previous section, if
anything, our benchmark results may underestimate the overall eﬀects.
7.4 Shape parameter
The ﬁnal issue we address is the calibration of the shape parameter of the underlying Pareto distrib-
ution of productivity draws (ks). As argued by Bernard et al. (2003), individual TFP productivity
ˆ Prodi i sc e r t a i n l ym e a s u r e dw i t ha ne r r o r . E v e ni fs u c he r r o rw e r eu n c o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h e‘ t r u e ’
26productivity Prodi, it should nonetheless deﬂa t et h ev a l u eo fks.31 In other words, measurement
errors may make us observe too much TFP variability across ﬁrms so that our ks (whose average in
OLS estimations is 2.095) may be too low. Bernard et al. (2003) propose to solve that problem by
reconstructing the parameters of the productivity distribution from aggregate data. In particular,
they recover the shape parameter of their Fréchet distribution by matching the productivity and
size advantage of exporters between simulated and actual US data. Such solution comes at the cost
of imposing more structure. Indeed, one has to believe that not only ﬁrm productivity follows a
certain distribution but also all other assumptions (on demand, market structure, etc.), which are
needed to obtain the average productivity of exporters from the theoretical model, hold. While we
consider our approach as more reliable, we ﬁnd it useful to check how sensitive our results to the
potential mismeasurement of ks.
Unfortunately we do not have reliable export data in the Amadeus database, so we can not
exploit the size and the productivity advantage of exporters as Bernard et al. (2003) do. Therefore,
we simply check how our benchmark results change when we adopt their value ks =3 .6,w h i c hi s
the same for all sectors since their analysis has no sectoral disaggregation. It is important to remark
that we can use their estimate because the Fréchet and the Pareto distributions are closely related.
Indeed, in their model, where only the lowest cost supplier is active in any particular country, if all
potential suppliers draw their costs from an unobservable Pareto distribution with shape parameter
ks, then the corresponding observable extreme value distribution is precisely a Fréchet distribution
with shape parameter ks.
Table 22: Costs of non-Europe by country with diﬀerent ks: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country % Costs of non-Europe % Costs of non-Europe %C o s t so fn o n - E u r o p e
BE Belgium 17.68 16.29 16.72
DE Germany 22.89 26.76 23.29
DK Denmark 23.20 21.20 22.29
ES Spain 11.56 13.94 11.63
FI Finland 14.15 13.22 13.34
FR France 13.60 13.77 13.05
GB Great Britain 3.59 4.39 3.31
IT Italy 6.87 8.31 6.66
NL Netherlands 12.64 12.58 12.03
PT Portugal 4.97 5.27 4.62
SE Sweden 12.73 10.35 11.43
Average 13.08 13.28 12.58
ks our ks’s reduced by 20% ks =3 .6 for all s our ks’s
There is, however, a diﬀerent reason why our calibration of ks may instead be too high. In our
model more (physically) productive ﬁrms set lower prices, so they do not entirely translate their
higher productivity into higher values of sales per worker. Therefore, our productivity estimation,
which, as standard, is based on the value of sales or value added, may underestimate (overestimate),
31The variance of a Pareto distribution is a decreasing function of ks.I np a r t i c u l a r ,i fX is distributed as a Pareto
with shape parameter ks, the standard error of ln(X) is 1/ks. A simple way to recover ks is thus to consider the
standard error of ln( ˆ Prodi)= ˆ const +ˆ εi. Clearly, as long as there is an uncorrelated measurement error in the
estimates of const and εi, the standard error of the variable ˆ const +ˆ εi is greater than that of const + εi,a n ds oks
is underestimated.
27Table 23: Gains from (freer) trade with diﬀerent ks: OLS estimations.
Country initials Country % Gains from trade % Gains from trade % Gains from trade
BE Belgium 2.24 3.06 2.86
DE Germany 2.99 13.24 4.60
DK Denmark 3.28 15.78 4.40
ES Spain 1.40 5.93 2.11
FI Finland 1.40 5.63 1.81
FR France 1.31 5.02 1.74
GB Great Britain 0.19 -0.71 0.23
IT Italy 0.51 1.14 0.66
NL Netherlands 0.96 4.15 1.24
PT Portugal 1.03 -0.90 2.02
SE Sweden 1.34 0.19 1.81
Average 1.51 4.78 2.13
ks our ks’s reduced by 20% ks =3 .6 for all s our ks’s
the TFP of more (less) productive ﬁrms, thus reducing the observed variance of productivity and
overstating ks. This potential bias is studied by Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005), who
present the only TFP research we know that relies on ﬁrm-level physical quantities. They ﬁnd that
at plant level physical productivities are inversely correlated with prices so that the standard error
of (the ln of) revenue-based TFP is lower than the one of the output-based TFP, as predicted by
our model. However, they also ﬁnd that the correlation between revenue-based and output-based
TFP’s is not negligible (0.64) and the bias in terms of standard errors of (the ln of) productivities,
which is all that matters for our ks, is rather small (0.20).32
Tables 22 and 23 respectively compare our benchmark results on the ‘costs of non-Europe’ and
the ‘gains from (freer) trade’ with those obtained by either reducing all our ks’s by 20 per cent in
the wake of Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2005) or attributing ks =3 .6 to all sectors in the
wake of Bernard et al. (2003). This amounts to increasing our average ks by 70 per cent from
its OLS value of 2.1. In general, one should not expect the productivity gains from selection to
change monotonically with ks a st w oo p p o s i n ge ﬀects operate. On the one hand, for given trade
freeness, as ks grows the impact of selection on productivity becomes stronger because the cost
distribution becomes more skewed towards less productive ﬁrms. On the other hand, for a given





¢−ks falls, which weakens ﬁrm selection. Non-
monotonicity characterizes Table 22 as both reducing and increasing ks slightly raise the average
‘costs of non-Europe’, although this is not the case for all countries. Table 23 shows, instead, that
the average ‘gains from (freer) trade’ change monotonically with ks, although this is not the case
for all countries. Overall, our simulations suggest that correcting ks the 20-per-cent upward bias
changes our results only slightly, whereas imposing ks =3 .6 increase substantially only the ‘gains
from (freer) trade’. The main reason for this behavior is that a 5 per cent reduction in trade costs
(τlh
s ) translates into diﬀerent increases in trade openness (ρlh
s ) depending on the level of ks.
Once more, if anything, our benchmark results may underestimate the overall selection eﬀect.
Note that the fact the the ‘costs of non-Europe’ change little with ks is due to free entry and exit
as prospective entrants anticipate the eﬀects of ks on selection. This shows that the adjustment in
32The problem of the unobserved price bias is highlighted by Klette and Griliches (1996). Melitz (2000) proposes
a correction based on a simple CES Dixit-Stigliz model with constant markups. Unfortunately the complexity of our
model with variable markups prevents us from applying any simple comparable correction.
28the number of entrants enriches the industry dynamics with respect to what is already highlighted
by Bernard et al. (2003).
8C o n c l u s i o n
We have calibrated a multi-country multi-sector model with heterogeneous ﬁrms, monopolistic
competition and variable markups on ﬁrm-level data and trade ﬁgures for a panel of 11 EU countries.
When simulating diﬀerent integration scenarios, we have found that in the year 2000 an increase
of trade barriers to prohibitive levels would have caused an average productivity loss of roughly 13
per cent, associated with a 16 per cent average increase in both prices and markups as well as a fall
of 23 per cent in average proﬁts. On the other hand, a 5 per cent reduction in trade costs, would
have raised average productivity by roughly 2 per cent, leading to a 2 per cent average decreases in
both prices and markups as well as a 5 per cent increase in average proﬁts. These estimates have
been shown to be fairly robust to alternative measures of productivity and trade costs. Indeed, the
robustness checks overall suggest that, if anything, those numbers may actually underestimate the
overall selection eﬀects. This reveals that the Darwinian selection of the best ﬁrms is an important
eﬀect of trade liberalization.
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31Appendix
AN u m b e r o f ﬁrms and welfare
The mass of sellers Nl
s in sector s and country l (including domestic producers in l and exporters
to l) is given by (9). With a positive mass of entrants Nl









E,s exporters selling in l since chl
s is the export cutoﬀ from












The latter provides a system of M linear equations that can be solved for the number of entrants


















E,s entrants in country l, Nl
E,sGl
s(cll
s) ﬁrms survive and produce for the local market.
Among the latter, Nl
E,sGl
s(clh
s ) export to country h.
As shown by Ottaviano and Melitz (2005), the indirect uility in country l depends only on its

















Once again, welfare changes monotonically with the domestic cost cutoﬀ, which captures the dom-
inant eﬀects of product variety and average prices.
33We use the properties that relate the freeness matrix P and its transpose in terms of determinants and cofactors.
A-1Figure A.1: Accessibility to International Trade
A-2